Researchers Demo How To Build Nearly Invisible Backdoor In Computer Chips
Source: Jai Vijayan
Modification almost impossible to catch in post-fab tests says University of Michigan researchers in report that details proof-of-concept attack
Researchers at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor have demonstrated how someone could install a virtually undetectable backdoor on a microprocessor during the fabrication process that could be exploited later to gain complete access to systems running the tampered chips.
The method, detailed in a technical paper innocuously titled ‘Analog Malicious Hardware’, was presented recently at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. The researchers described it as the first fabrication-time processor attack of its kind and the first to demonstrate an analog attack that is substantially smaller and stealthier than a digital attack.
The attack involves the addition of a single, booby-trapped logic gate to a chip that is ready for fabrication and the use of an extremely stealthy process for triggering changes in the gate’s functionality so it eventually acts in a malicious manner. The attack method is virtually undetectable because it involves no significant changes to the chip’s circuitry or design, according to the researchers.
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